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-

the record in the court file.

This Appeal is from the

Conclusions of Law and the Decree entered by the Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were married on December 10 f 1952 f and had three
children of this marriage.

At the time of this marriagef

Plaintiff had two minor children from a prior marriage and was
living on welfare.

After this marraige the Plaintiff and her

children of her prior marriage resided with the Plaintiff until
their enamcipation and received all maintenance from the
Defendant.
Plaintiff commenced divorce action in Wasatch County on May
27, 1964, Civil #2652/ which resulted in a temporary order of
support and alimony.

Parties reconciled and this action was

finally dismissed by the Court in 1977 for failure to prosecute.
In 1971/ Plaintiff again commenced an action in Wasatch County,
Civil #3247/ which ended in divorce dated March 12 f 1971.
On the 8th day of June, 1976/ the above District Court
entered a Modification Of Decree modifying the 1971 Decree.
modification provided in l . C :
"Plaintiff LoWana Egan Lee is hereby awarded and
defendant is ordered to pay to said Plaintiff
the sum of $75.00 per month alimony, said payments to be made to the clerk of the court for
the benefit of said plaintiff until said plaintiff obtains work and receives gross income of
$200.00 or more per month at which time said
alimony shall be reduced to the sum of $50.00
per month/ said payments to be made to the
clerk of the court for the benefit of said
plaintiff in semi-monthly installments of
one-half of the amount of alimony due in that
monrh on the 1st and 16th days of each month
commencing May l f 1976/ and continuing on the
-2-

The

same days of each month until said plaintiff
remarries, dies, or until the further order
of the court, whichever events occurs first."
Pursuant to said divorce Decree, all of the assets of the
parties were distributed with the Plaintiff and the Department of
Social Services receiving the bulk thereof.

In addition, the

Plaintiff was ordered to pay support for the one remaining minor
child and alimony for the Plaintiff.
That the remaining minor child was emancipated in 1981.
Defendant paid all support and alimony as ordered by the
Court until November, 1985, at which point he became disabled and
also at which point he learned that the Plaintiff was receiving
Social Security disability payments and had been since January of
1985.
The Court found that the Defendant's gross earning have
dropped from $36,000.00 per year, at the time of modification in
1976, to approximately $1,300.00 per month at the present.

That

during the marriage the parties gross income never exceeded
$15,000.00 per year.
The Court further found that the Defendant's retirement
income was principally due to efforts made by him after the
divorce Decree was entered by going to school, learning a trade,
qualifying as an operator, and pursuing such training until his
disability in 1985.
The Courr further found that the Plaintiff had never
maintined employment since the marriage or since the divorce
except for brief short periods and has never provided the
financial resources to support herself or her family since this

marriage - always electing to receive public assistance.

The

Court found a material change of circumstances and ordered a
reduction in alimony but declined to terminate alimony
completely, electing to review the facts in comparison with 1976
modification only and refusing to review events and circumstances
from the time of the divorce.
The Defendant has since remarried.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENT NUMBER I
The Court erred in reviewing circumstances only from the
date of modification rather than to the date of the divorce.

In

reviewing dates and circumstances to 1976, the comparison was to
circumstances accruing outside the divorce from separate and
special effort by the Defendant and thus ignored merit of events
prior thereto.
ARGUMENT NUMBER II
The facts and circumstances in this case merit a termination
of alimony and the Court erred by failing to so rule. Alimony
should never be 'til death due us part1 and, once all children
have been emancipated, alimony becomes a penalty to the husband
and a reward to the wife.

ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN REVIEWING CIRCUMSTANCES ONLY
FROM THE DATE OF MODIFICATION RATHER THAN TO THE
DATE OF THE DIVORCE.
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The Court erred by refusing to review events and
circumstances at the time of the divorce instead of the date of
modification.
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of whether on a
petition to vacate alimony the Court should compare present
circumstances with time of the Decree or with the time of the
last petition for modification in the case of Short v Short,
(1971) 25 Utah 2d 326, 481 P.2d 54. The Court stared:
"There is but one point on appeal: That
the court erred in failing to compare the
parties present circumstances in relation
to those at the time of the decree.
By and large in the ordinary divorce case the
appellantfs contention would be meritorous, and
the cases decided by this court sustain his contention, " . . . and we base our conclusion here,
not necessarily on any authority to the effect
that the court views the facts in relation to the
last petition for modification, but because the
denial was not caprecious when viewed in the light
of circumstances existing at the time of the divorce . . . f ".
When we view the facts in relation to the modification
rather than the time of the divorce, it becomes possible to
ignore the following facts:
1.

Due to Appellants efforts after the divorce, while Repondant was collecting support and alimnony, he went to
school, learned a trade as an operator, and pursued his
trade until no longer able to do so.

That because of

his effort his present income is more than 70% derived
outside of the marriage.
2.

The Respondant made no legitimate effort to obtain
employment - electing to rely on public assistance
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for about 13 years before any claim of disability and
approximately 4 years thereafter.
3.

That Appellant didn't cause Respondant to become a public charge, in fact he took her and her minor children
of a prior marriage off the rolls and provided all
their support until their emancipation.

4.

That her present income is derived from his Social
Security benefits.

5.

That the Appellant has been under an alimony Order
longer than he was married.

6.

That the divorce was the second divorce action commenced by the Respondant.

That Appellant paid tem-

porary alimony during their separation.
7.

That Appellant is now remarried and has other
responsibilities.

8.

That their youngest child was emancipated some 7 years
ago.
POINT II
UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
OF THIS CASE, THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
ORDER AN END TO ALIMONY.

There is great disparity in the rulings of the Supreme Court
on alimony.

Some cases have held that the length cf marriage was

a factor and others have had held to the contrary. English v
English, 565 P.2d 409 (1977), Frank v Frank, 585 P.2d 453 (1978).
Length of marriage, ncwever, standing alone doesn't mean much.
It can mean greater contribution to the marriage, but it can also
mean greater endurance of the marriage as well.
-6-

The more one has

put up with it, the more society will require. Tying the duration
of alimony to the length of marriage is like the degrees of
criminal offenses.

If the husband puts up with the marriage for

a month, it is a class B Misdemeanor; if 5 years, a Class A; if
10 years, a Third Degree Felony; if 15 years, a Second Degree
Felony (1 to 15); if over, it is life.
Other cases have tied alimony to the wife's needs and her
income or ability to produce-income.

English v English, Supra

Since everyone has needs, the effect on the payor is controlled
exclusively on her income and ability to produce income.

Thus,

where we have a wife who will not obtain and maintain employment
(everyone not physically or mentally handicapped is capable of
employment of some type) she still has needs that must be paid
for.
Other cases have held that the purpose of alimony is to keep
wife off public dole. When looked at from the defendant
position, the husband is stuck unless she will support herself.
If one is dumb enough to take a person off public assistance, he
becomes responsible thereafter so long as he has capacity.
Regardless of the wife's track record in prior marriage, the
husband must bear the burden if the marriage fails and she won't
support herself.
Other cases have held there should be no alimony where the
wife is willing to support herself. (Walker v Walker, 707 P.2d
110 (1985): 8 year marriage (No Alimony); Workman v Workman, 652
P.2d 931: (No alimony)
Other cases have approved limited duration as reasonable
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while still other are to the contrary.

Turner v Turner, 64S P.2d

6 (1982): 11 year marriage, 24 months; Bushnel v Bushnell, 649
P.2d 85 (1982): 11 year marriage, 4 years; Warren v Warren, 655
P.2d 684 (1982): 27 year marriage, 4 years; Holt v Holt, 655 P.2d
677 (1982): 11 year marriage, 6 years; Jeppson v Jeppson, 684
P.2d 69 (1984): 10 year marriage, 13 years; King v King, 495 P.2d
823, 27 Ut 2d 303: 16 year marriage, no time limit.
The over all view of the cases on alimony by the author
leads to the conclusion that there is no consistency.

If a

person gets caught in a failed marriage, he may escape punishment
altogether or do a life term; but the likelihood of a life term
is much greater if one has put forth the effort to work and earn
and especially so if the wife does not.
The vast discrepencies in the decisions perhaps is a result
of the nature of the problem and the rule of appellant review.
The temptation of the courts to pass the financial burden to an
ex-husband seems too irrestible and simple.

However, it oftimes

ignores the element of fairness. What is it that a person has
done in getting married that burdens him (nor to his children)
but to his ex-spouse for life, particularly a first marriage.
(Perhaps for a second marriage, if he didn't learn better from
the first.)

When should alimony be a life sentence?

Once the

children are emancipated, hasn't the time come when a husband has
provided all the required financial assistance for adjustment to
their separate lives. When is enough enough?

Isn't 17 years

enough to demonstrate that she will not make a normal effort to
get off the public rolls? Should the substantial discression
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afforded a trial court be used to ignore when alimony should
cease?

How long after emancipation of their children should

alimony continue?

Is need the sole" criteria since those whc

won't provide for theirselves always have'needs?

When should a

pardon be granted or time off for good behavior be given?

When

has he paid his debt to society?
Since the decisions are so varied it is impossible to cite a
case for limited duration without also citing cases with
unlimited duration•

The trend, howeverr nationally and in Utah

does appear to be to limited duration

(See cases cited above).

Using language about reward or punishment doesn't seem to
equate in any manner to the decisions of our court or to the
effects upon the parties.

Once all the accumulated assets are

dispersed and the children are provided for, all alimony except
for a reasonable adjustment period beyond emancipation of
dependent children becomes a reward to the 'wife and a punishment
to the husband.

Worse still, it becomes an incentive not to pack

one's own weight.
-Allowing alimony as punishment and reward makes much more
sense and at least can be equated with the seriousness of the
offense.

It has the added advantage in that it doesn't reward

lack of effort and industry and punish for it.
It is recognized that under the rules pronounced by the
Supreme Court for Appellant review that great latitude is
accorded the trial judge, particularly where the evidence is in
dispute.

However, here the evidence is not in dispute.

See

Wiese v Wiese, 24 Utah 2d 236, 469 P.2d 504 and cases cited
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therein.

The latitude of a trial court is often stated in terms

of a presumption.
". ^ . the trial judge has considerable latitude
of discression in such matters and that his
judgement should not be changed lightly,
and in fact, not at all, unless it works
such a manifest injustice or iniquity as to
indicate a clear abuse cf discression."
Wilson v Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977.
The problems with such a rule where there is no rule is that
the trial judge is correct regardless of whether he terminates
alimony or doesn't. Without the perimeters for termination of
alimony being identified it becomes a roll of the dice. A
reading of the cases would seem to demonstrate that the court has
not: pronounced the criteria for the duration of alimony or its
termination that the trial courts can use as a guide.
There is a need for a more rational criteria for termination
of alimony and a ruling that the total picture can be examined tc
determine merit not merely a limited time span.

'-Til death do us

part1 should not be a criteria of alimony and, particularly,
after all children are emancipated.

There should be some

consistency in the burdens of marriage and the court is the only
body able to affect that consistency.
Our court (it is not alone) has turned marriage into a very
foolish venture - likewise honest effort and responsibility.
Hopefully this case can provide a forum for some rationalr
consistent framework for the duration of alimony.
Our Constitution requires that our laws have uniform
application.

Art 1 §24. When has any court in this state

required a wife to pay alimony to her husband for life?
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Laws

that depend upon discression of the trial court and abuse of
discression by the appeals court for reversal produce such
disparity that they can have no uniform application without
specific guidlines.

That is why we get rulings of anywhere from

nothing to a lifetime burden.

The court should catch up with the

trend in this country and view the parties to a failed marriage
in a more equal posture.

The courts rulings on alimony refute

the liberation of woman and their equality and reflect a time in
the past when society frowned on a wife working or having a
business or career of her own - when society never expected a
wife to attempt to carry her own weight financially, merely to be
tied to the stove and broom.
CONCLUSION
The Court in being able to close its eyes to the totality of
the evidence and its merits has been able to ignore the
fundamental principle of fairness and has been cast in the
position of trying to decide an area of the law without adequate
guidelines.

In its dilema, the Court has erred in failing to

consider all the evidence and in failing to decide when enough is
enough based upon principles of societies value.

This case

should be remanded with instructions and guidelines on the
duration of alimony and its termination.
Respectfully Submitted,

J0M L. CHIDSS^ER "^attorney for Appellant
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Amended Decree of Divorce
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Addendum 2

Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law

Addendum 3

Modification of Decree of
Divorce and Judgment

Addendum 4

Decree of Divorce

Addendum 5

Tertporary Order

1

Brent J. Jensen, USB #3723
Attorney for^ Plaintiff
One East Center Street
Suite 211
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: 373-7761

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LOWANA EGAN LEE,
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE
AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
:

Civil No. CV-86-893

STERLING CALVIN LEE,
(Judge Ray M. Harding)
Defendant.

THIS
court,

CAUSE

on regularly for hearing

before

this

sitting without a jury, on January 6, 1988, Plaintiff

appearing
J.

came

in person and through plaintiff's attorney,

Jensen,

and

Defendant

Defendant's attorney,
heard

appearing in person and

John L.

Chidester.

Brent
through

The Court

having

the evidence of the parties and the cause having

submitted

to

the Court,

decision in writing,

and the Court having rendered

which decision consists of Findings

been
its
of

Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1. Paragraph I.e. of the Decree of Divorce signed by the

court

on

May 18,

1976 and entered in this case on May

21,

1976, be and the same is hereby modified as follows:
l.C. Plaintiff LoWana Egan Lee is hereby awarded and
defendant* is ordered to pay to said Plaintiff
the sum
of
$50.00 per month alimony,
said payments to be made to
the
clerk of the court for the benefit of said plaintiff in semimonthly installments of one-half of the amount of alimony due
in that month
on the 1st and
16th days
of each month
commencing February 1, 1938, and continuing on the same days
of each month until said plaintiff remarries, dies, or until
the further order of the court, whichever event occurs first.
2.
Decree

All

other

paragraphs and provisions of

the

of Divorce shall remain unchanged and in full

prior
effect

and force as they were before this modification.
3.

Plaintiff

is awarded judgement against Defendant in

the amount of $1,075.00 for unpaid alimony from October
through January 1988.

DATED:

BY THE COURT:

District Judge
Approved as to form:

John L. Chidester,
attornev for defendant

2

1985

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I

HEREBY CERTIEY that I mailed a n accurate copy of the

F ' 111 d i n g s
Decree
John

: :!:: F a ::: t
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Brent J. Jensen, #3723
Attorney for Plaintiff
One East Center Street
Suite 211
Provo, Utah 84601
IN THE FOURIH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FCR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * & *

IOvANA EGAN LEEf

:

Plaintiff,

:

-vs-

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

STERLING CALVIN LEEf

:

Defendant-

:

Civil No. CV-86-893
(Judge Ray M. Harding)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The above entitled matter came on for trial before this court on January
6f 1988- At issue was the defendant's objection to the Domestic Relations
Commissioner's recommendation filed on November 24, 1987,
2.

Plaintiff was present with her counsel, Brent J. Jensen-

Defendant

was present with his counsel, John L. Chidester. That the court and all
parties approved the presentation of evidence by proffer with evidence to be
received if any proffer was contested.
3. The court having thus been fully advised and upon a review of the
record in the court's file, the court now renders its decision and makes the
following findings and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The court altered a Modification of Decree of Divorce and Judgement

on May 18, 1976, which states in the pertinent part:
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l.C. Plaintiff LoWana Egan Lee is hereby awarded and defendant is
ordered to pay to said Plaintiff the sum of $75.00 per month alimony, said
payments to be made to the clerk of the court for the benefit of said
plaintiff until said plaintiff obtains work and receives a gross incone of
$200.00 or more per month at which time said alimony shall be reduced to the
sum of $50.00 per month, said paymeits to be made to the clerk of the court
for the benefit of said plaintiff in semi-monthly installments of one-half of
the amount of alimony due in that month on the 1st and 16th days of each month
comneicing May 1, 1976 and continuing on the same days of each month until
said plaintiff renarries, dies, or until the further order of the court,
whichever evert occurs first.
2.

Plaintiff filed a motion for an order to show cause on February 11,

1986, requesting judgemert for alimony arrearage.
3. Defendant stopped paying alimony in November 1985 when he discovered
plaintiff was receiving social security benefits for disability in excasss

of

$200.00 per month beginning in January 1985.
4.

Defendant has retired due to disability.

5. Defendant's gross earnings have dropped from $36,000 per year at the
time of modification in 1976, to approximately $1300 per month at the preseit.
That the defendant became disabled and has been unable to work since
September, 1985; that during this marriage, plaintiff's income was less than
$15,000 a year.
6.

That the plaintiff has never maintained enployment since the marriage

or since the divorce except for brief short time periods and has never
provided the financial resources to support herself and/or family since the
marriage.
7.

That the defendant after the divorce was able to increase his earning

capacity and increase his retirement income by going to schcol, learning a
trade, qualifying as an operator, and pursing said trade until his disability
in 1985.
8. Defendant has remarried.
9.

Plaintiff and her two minor children were public charges prior to the
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marriage of the parties and after the divorce of the parties. Plaintiff is
unenployed and ner need has not diminished even with the benefits she receives
froti social security which total $396.80 per month as set out in her Affidavit
on April 20,1 1987.
10.

The disability paymeits received by plaintiff are in lieu of wages

that plaintiff might otherwise obtain from employment.
11.

That the plaintiff and the defendsant were married approximately 17

years before their divorce in 1971.
12.

That the defendant took the plaintiff and her children off of the

public rolls and provided all the support for her and her minor children firm
their marriage until the emancipation of the two children.
13.

That the natural father of the two minor children of the plaintiff

from the prior marriage was under a support order, but the natural father
never contributed in any manner to their support.
14.

That the plaintiff has paid all support and all alimony until he

discovered that plaintiff's disability incone; that plaintiff has paid alimony
since 1971.
15.

Based upon the above conditions, the court finds that a material

change of circumstances has occured in that defendant's ability to pay alimony
has been reduced dramatically since his retirement for health reasons.
Fran the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LflW
1.

That the court only reviews the matter from date of modification to

the present and dees net review events and circumstances prior thereto.
2.

In Paffel v Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court

determined the purpose of alimony to be to enable the receiving spouse to
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maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living enjoyed during the
marriaGe and prevent that spouse from bccming a public charge. Unfortunately,
Plaintiff was a public charge prior to the parties1 marriage as well as
subsequent to the parties1 divorce •
3. A material change of circumstances has occurred in that Defeidant's
ability to pay alimony has been reduced dramatically since his retirenent for
health reasons, but Defendant still receives approximately $1,300.00 per month
as inccme.
4.

Therefore, Defendant's alimony obligation should have been reduced to

$50.00 per month effective January 1985. As a result, Defendant should be
credited for $275.00 as excess payments until November 1985.
5.

Eecause Defendant has made no alimony payments since October 1985,

Defendant is in arrears in the sum of $1,350.00 through January 1988, minus
$275.00 credited for excess payments made January through October of 1985, for
a total alimony arrearage of $1,075.00. Plaintiff is awarded a judgement for
said amount.
6.

Defendant is required to continue to be responsible to Plaintiff for

alimony in the sum of $50.00 per month.
DATED this

day of

, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT JUDGE

Approved as to form:

John L. Chidester
Attorney for Defendant
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McCUNE & McCUNE
George M. McCune
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f
96 E a s t 100 South
P . 0 . Box 7k6
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone 373-0307
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTI, STATE OF UTAH
-0O0-

LOWAHA EGAN LEE, and STATE OF
UTAH by and- through UTAH STATE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 32^7

MODIFICATION OF DECREE
OF DIVORCE AND JUDGMENT

vs.
STERLING CALVIN LEE,
Defendant.-

This matter came on for hearing before the court without a jury at

?-/?'/(•

made and filed its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows, to-wit:
1.

The decree of divorce heretofore entered in this case on &krch 25,

1971? be and the same is hereby modified as follows:
a.

Plaintiff LoWana Egan Lee is awarded the care, custody

and control of the remaining minor child of the parties, Linda Lee, subject
to reasonable rights of visitation by defendant as follows, to-wit: Defendant
is given the right to visit and take control of said minor child one day a
week on each Saturday, unless defendant's work interferes, in which event
the defendant is given the right to visit and take control of said minor
child on an alternate day to be fixed by mutual agreement of the parties
at least 10 days prior to said change of day.

In the event defendant will

not visit said child on the regular day, defendant shall furnish plaintiff
LoWana Egan Lee at least 2k hours prior oral or written notice of said intent
before said day.

In the event defendant fails to so notify plaintiff LoWana

Egan Lee when he does not plan on visiting said child on any regular day,
defendant shall thenceforth be required to give plaintiff LoWana Egan Lee
at least 2k hours oral or written notice prior to his visiting or picking
up said minor child.

In addition to the aforesaid visitation rights, defen-

dant is given the right to visit said minor child at plaintiff LoWana Egan
Lee's residence on each Christmas day. Defendant is also given the right
to take charge of the minor child of the parties for a period of 2 weeks during
July of each year or for such other 2-week period during regular school summer

support of the parties1 minor child, Linda Lee, born January lo, 19^5 > said
payments to be made to the clerk of the court for the benefit /tof said
plaintiff in semi-monthly installments of $50.00 each on the 1st and l6th
days of each month commencing May 1, 1976, and continuing on the same days
of each month thereafter until said child reaches her majority, dies or
until the further order of the court, whichever event occurs first,
c.

Plaintiff LoWana Egan Lee is hereby awarded and defendant is

ordered to pay to said plaintiff the sum of $75*00 per month alimony, said
payments to be made to the clerk of the court for the benefit of said plaintiff
until said plaintiff obtains work and receives^Jrgross income of $200.00 or
more per month at which time said alimony shall be reduced to the sum of $50.00
per month, said payments to be made to the clerk of the court for the benefit
of said plaintiff in semi-monthly installments of one-half of the amount of
alimony due in that month on the 1st and l6th days of each month commencing
May 1, IS765 2nd continuing on the same days of each month until said plaintiff
remarries, dies or until the further order of the court, whichever event
occurs first•
d.

The real property of the parties is hereby divided and disposed

of as follows:

Plaintiff LoWana Egan Lee and defendant Sterling Calvin Lee

are each awarded a one-half divided interest as tenants in common to the
following real property commonly known by street address of 680 North 500 West,
Provo, Utah, located in Utah County, State of Utah, and more particularly
described as follows, to-wit:
Beginning at a point on the East line of Fifth West Street,
••

- ° --
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defendant and any sums due plaintiff LoWana Egan Lee from defendant. Said
property shall be listed for sale for $35*000.00 and any offer for less than
s3G<d sum shall be submitted to the court for its approval.

The proceeds of

said sale shall .be divided between plaintiff LoWana Egan Lee and defendant
Sterling Calvin Lee as tenants in common after all liens to plaintiff the Utah
State Department of Social Services and others are satisfied and a.11 costs
and expenses of sale including additional attorney fees of sale are paid.
e.

Plaintiff LoWana Egan Lee is awarded the exclusive possession

of said real property and home and improvements thereon for as long as she
desires.until the sale of said property is complete and possession delivered
to the new buyer provided said plaintiff pays defendant for his one-half share
of the rental value of said property in the sum of $90-00 per month for each
month or portion thereof said plaintiff occupies said premises following
May 1, 1976.
f.

Plaintiff LoWana Egan Lee and defendant are ordered to each

pay one-half of the mortgage payments due on the real property of said parties
commencing May 1, 1976, and thereafter until said property is sold and possession
delivered to the new buyer.
g.

Defendant is ordered and he

is hereby permanently restrained

from in any way using or representing the street address of 630 North
500 West5 Provo3 Utah 8k6019

or any portion thereof as or to be his mailing

address or place of domicile and he is further permanently restrained from
in any way coming on or in the premises of plaintiff LoWana Egan Lee and

fOI costs of court herein,
k.

Plaintiff the State of Utah by and through Utah State Department

oiNSocial Services is granted judgment against defendant in the sum of
$7*765-10 for accrued alimony and support through April 30, 1976, under the
former decree which is yet unpaid.
DATED this

g

<(A

day of \

a

jt ^^-^T

, 1976.

BY 3EE COUHT:

**&<-*3)>\

w

District/Judge
Attest:

Clerk of the Court
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' - ^ t y of Wasatch

)

J in my office
::^:c-:Jco,rtth,s
f
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
LO WANA EGAN LEE,
Plaintiff,

r
+
32kl

vs.

t

Civil No.

STERLING CALVIN LEE,

t

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Defendant.

t

The above entitled matter came on regularly and duly for trial before the
Court on the Uth day of March, 1S71* before the Honorable Maurice Harding,
Judge, presiding. Plaintiff was present and represented by her attorney,
F. H. Eutterfield. Defendant was also present and represented by his attorney,
John Chidester.
The parties were sworn and testified and from the evidence therein
adduced, the Court made and entered in writing its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law herein:
IT IS NOW Ff THE COURT KZREFf ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1. That Plaintiff, Lo VJana Egan Lee, be and she is hereby awarded an
interlocutory Decree of Divorce from the Defendant, Sterling Calvin Lee upon
tne grounds of cruelty, said Decree to become final three months from date of
entry hereof, unless an appeal or other proceedings for review are pending,
or uhe Court before the expiration of said period for sufficient cause, upon
its motion or upon the application of any person, whether interested or no*c,
otherwise orders*
2a The Plaintiff is hereby awarded the care, custody and control of the

h* The P l a i n t i f f i s h e r e b y awarded, and t h e Defendant i s h e r e b y
Ordered t o pay t o t h e P l a i n t i f f t h e sum of $200.00 p e r month as alimony and
-support - u n t i l - t h e f u r t h e r -Crder-pf-_-the-Court^ t h e - s a m e - t o be p a i d - i n - t v o — e q u a l
semi monthly i n s t a l l m e n t s of SlGCo00 payable on t h e f i r s t and s i x t e e n t h days
of each and e v e r y month h e r e a f t e r commencing March 1 6 , 1 9 7 1 , u n t i l t h e

further

Order of t h e Court 9
So The Court makes no d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e r e s p e c t i v e i n t e r e s t s of t h e
p a r t i e s i n t h e d w e l l i n g house l o c a t e d a t 680 N o r t h , 500 West, Frovo, Utah
County, Utah a t t h i s t i m e .

However should the Defendant f a i l t o pay t o t h e

P l a i n t i f f the sum of S2C0.C0 p e r month as alimony and s u p p o r t as p r o v i d e d i n
p a r a g r a p h f o u r above, t h e s e sums which a r e not p a i d are hereby Ordered t o
become a Lien i n f a v o r of t h e P l a i n t i f f

and a g a i n s t t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s

interest

i n t h e s a i d d w e l l i n g house l o c a t e d a t 660 North, 5C0 Wes"0, Frovo, Utah County,
Utah.
6o Defendant i s h e r e b y Ordered t o pay t h e f a m i l y o b l i g a t i o n s of t h e
p a r t i e s and t o save and h o l d harmless zhe p l a i n t i f f

therefrcm 0

7« P l a i n t i f f i s hereby awarded Judgment as a g a i n s t t h e Defendant
i n t h e amount of $300*00 f o r a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s f o r t h e use aid b e n e f i t of h e r
a t t o r n e y , F . K<> E u u t e r f i e i d ,

for h i s s e r v i c e s i n t h i s a c t i o n , and Defendant

i s h e r e b y Ordered t o pay t h i s sum t o F* H# B u u t e r f i e l d *

Dated and signed on t h i s / "> "CT"day of March, 1 9 7 1 .

EY

THE COURT:

*1
IT"

W nm FOURTH JUOfOAt. DISTRICT COURTOF.THg STATE OF UTAH

|

2!

IN AND FDR WASATCH COUNTY

3

4

LOWANA CONNER LEE,
Plaintiff,

S.i
6i

7

-vsCivil No.

STERLINGC. LEE,

8

Defendant.

9
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10
11

TEMPORARY ORDER

f

This matter came on regularly to be heard by the Court, sitting without

12

a jury, on the 15th day of June, 1964, upon the Order to Show Cause heretofore

13

issued by this Court on or about May 27, 1964. Plaintiff appeared in person and

14

by her counsel, J. Robert Bullock, of the firm of Aldrich, Bullock & Nelson.

15

Defendant appeared in person and by his counsel, Phillip V. Christenson, of the

16
17
18

firm of Christenson, Paulson & Taylor. Based upon a stipulation of the parties
made in open court, it is now

19

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

20

1.

That plaintiff is awarded the temporary care, custody and control of

21

the minor children of the parties, subject to the right of defendant to visit witfi

22

said children at reasonable times and places.

23

2.

That defendant be, and he is hereby ordered to pay to the plaintiff as

24
25
26

temporary alimony and support money the sum of $180. 00 per month, payable
$90. 00 on the 1st and 15th days of each month until further order of the Court;

27

provided, however, that for the balance of the month of June, 1964, defendant

28

shall pay the sum of $100. 00 forthwith.

29

3.

That in addition to the foregoing, defendant be, and he is hereby

and use of the Pontiac automobile of the parties, and the temporary use and
occupancy of the home located at Provo, Utah.
M

6.

That plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded the temporary custody and|

6
w II use of bunk beds, bedding, and other items of housenoid furnishings and furnitur'
8
9

to be agreed upon by the parties
7.

That defendant be, and he is hereby ordered to maintain the medical

*-0 I and hospital insurance coverage which he now has upon the plaintiff and the minop
11
12

children
8.

Except as modified herein, the restraining order heretofore entered bty

13
14
15
26
17 I

the Court on or about May 27, 1964, be and the s a m e hereby is continued until
further order of the Court.
//

Dated this

/ 7 ^ day of June, 1964.
BY THE COURT

18 i
1 9

"

201|
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

"

'

'

Judge
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